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Abstract
In late January of 2017, President Trump signed an executive order banning non-American citizens traveling
into the United States from seven different countries. The title of the order was, “Protecting the Nation From
Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.” As implied, the stated purpose was to limit the number of
immigrants in order to avoid future attacks. President Trump claims that the executive order is necessary to
ensure the effectiveness of the United States’ immigrant vetting procedures and thus, protect the nation from
terrorist incursion. For the order to serve a purpose, immigration must play a role in terrorism. Thus, the
essential point of disagreement is whether a connection exists between the influx of migrants—especially
those from terror-prone nations—and the occurrence of terrorist activity in the receiving nation. In this study,
we attempt to discover if a link exists between immigration from terror-prone nations and terrorism by
examining the current literature and using data to analyze the levels of immigration as well as the incidents of
terrorism in six countries.
The hypothesis of this research project is that as countries receive increased levels of asylum seekers from
terror-prone nations they will experience a corresponding increase in the numbers of terror attacks within the
nation. Our basic premise is that immigrant flows form a social bridge, transplanting cultures, ideologies, as
well as individuals between the sending and receiving nations. Thus, we are seeking to find out if there is a
strong correlation between immigration and terrorism. The null hypothesis, then, is that there is no
correlation between immigration from terror-prone nations and the occurrence of terror attacks within a
particular nation.
Our research shows that, as predicted in our hypothesis, increased terrorism is linked to
increased migration from terror-prone nations and regions. The data from Germany and Turkey display a
strong positive correlation between asylum-seeker migration and incidents of terrorism. It is worth noting that
immigration alone is not enough to predict a rise in terrorist attacks. Rather, immigration is only one of many
factors that may lead to increased terrorism. However, it is our contention that immigration from terror-
producing regions is a significant predictor of increased terrorist activity.
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Bridges and Bandits on the Road to the 
New Jerusalem 
Ethan Beck, Unix Diza, and Amy Searl 
History and Government — Cedarville University 
Introduction 
n late January of 2017, President Trump signed an executive order banning non-
American citizens traveling into the United States from seven different countries. The 
title of the order was “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United 
States.” As implied, the stated purpose was to limit the number of immigrants in order to 
avoid future attacks. Since the order took effect, people have argued against it, making 
claims about religious discrimination, ethnic discrimination, and Islamophobia. Beyond the 
religious and ethnic issues, though, remains the question of efficacy. President Trump 
claims that the executive order is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the United States’ 
immigrant vetting procedures and thus protect the nation from terrorist incursion. In this 
way, he seeks to advance nationalist interests; his critics, meanwhile, assert that his actions 
are unfounded. Many who oppose the executive order argue that immigration does not play 
a role in the spread of terrorism, claiming that no immigrants from these particular 
countries have carried out successful terror attacks on the United States. For the order to 
serve a purpose, immigration must play a role in terrorism. Thus, the essential point of 
disagreement is whether a connection exists between the influx of migrants—especially 
those from terror-prone nations—and the occurrence of terrorist activity in the receiving 
nation. While there are a great deal of speculations and unfounded assertions on the 
possible link between immigration and terrorism, there have been few reliable, 
quantitative studies researching this question. The purpose of this study is to ameliorate 
the confusion caused by the dearth of research on this topic. In this study, we attempt to 
discover if a link exists between immigration from terror-prone nations and terrorism by 
examining the current literature and using data to analyze the levels of immigration as well 
as the incidents of terrorism in six countries.  
Literature Review 
As the world grapples with the refugee crisis stemming from Syria and other war-torn 
nations and destitute regions, one of the most contentious immigration policy issues is 
whether increasing immigration will lead to increased terrorist activity. The rise of Islamic 
terrorism with Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria over the last 
several years and the recent terror attacks in Europe have brought concerns of importing 
I 
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terrorism through immigration into the minds of many policy leaders of western nations, 
especially those nations that receive many migrants from the Middle East and other 
traditionally Islamic regions.1   
While there are many opinions on whether immigration causes terrorism and frequent 
debates on the subject in the news and halls of government, most of these opinions are 
supported by little more than anecdotal evidence.2 Until recently, little research existed on 
the topic, and what did exist could not make strong claims on the politically polarized 
relationship between these two phenomena.  
Some experts claim that any connection between immigration and terrorism is illusory or 
fabricated.3 Authors of this opinion point to the lack of data showing a connection and the 
fact that immigration has been a significant issue long before the rise of terrorism in the 
last several decades.4 One author even surmises that a connection between the two 
phenomena has been promulgated with the intent of restricting immigration as an end, 
rather than as a means to prevent terrorism.5 Another theory is that political leaders 
naturally transform complex, divisive questions into simple policy positions. 6 Essentially, 
the author argues that humans naturally substitute the “readiness with which [terrorism] 
comes to mind as a proxy for the probability” of it occurring.7 In the case of immigration, 
politicians and political pundits substitute the complex issues of immigration for simple 
questions of national security by promoting a fictitious connection between immigration—
especially illegal immigration—and terrorism.8 However, psychological arguments that 
individuals are inclined to substitute simple issues or complex issues by creating illusory 
connections or that humans naturally treat immigration and terrorism as if they are 
correlated without any justifying research is only significant if terrorism and immigration 
are actually unconnected. This is not the case.   
In fact, these views focus on how individuals make connections between immigration and 
terrorism without even considering the possibility that a connection exists. These authors 
silently discount several important research theories and studies that point to the opposite 
conclusion. Namely, that migration is a means through which terrorism is spread to 
previously unaffected nations and regions.9 However, not all migration is equally likely to 
                                                 
1 Colette G. Mazzucelli, “Secular States in a ‘Security Community’: The Migration-Terrorism Nexus?” Journal of 
Strategic Security 9, no. 3, (2016): 21. 
2 Vincenzo Bove and Tobias Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” The Journal of Politics 78, no. 2 
(2016): 572.   
3 For example, see: Maria S. Saux, "Immigration and Terrorism: A Constructed Connection," European Journal 
on Criminal Policy & Research 13, no. 1/2 (2007): 57-72; Mary De Ming Fan, "The Immigration-Terrorism 
Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake." Harvard Latino Law Review 10, (2007): 33-52; Mazzucelli, 
“Secular States in a ‘Security Community’”: 16-27.   
4 Saux, "Immigration and Terrorism: A Constructed Connection," 71.  
5 Ibid.  
6. Mary De Ming Fan, "The Immigration-Terrorism Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake," Harvard Latino 
Law Review 10, (2007): 34.  
7 Ibid, 35. 
8 Ibid, 33. 
9 Bove and Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” 572-588.   
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lead to increased terrorism. A 2016 study showed that immigration, in general, was 
positively correlated with a decrease in terrorist activity in the receiving nation.10 The 
study also quantitatively demonstrated that over 30 years in 175 countries, an increase in 
immigration from a nation with high levels of terrorist activity was positively correlated 
with increased terrorist activity in the receiving nation.11 Therefore, there is an empirical 
connection between immigration from terrorist-prone nations and the spread of terrorism 
to the country receiving the migrants.  
However, some qualitative studies suggest that this finding cannot be true because 
refugees and migrants are unlikely to harbor terrorist sympathies as they are often 
attempting to flee conflicts created by terrorist or other violent groups.12 While the 
conclusion—that migration from terror-prone nations does not facilitate the spread of 
terrorism—is empirically false, it is worth considering the relevance of the claim that 
refugees and migrants would oppose, rather than support, terrorism.  
First of all, even assuming that the mass majority of migrants have no intention of bringing 
terrorism into other nations, it is still possible that some do intend to do so. Given the 
damage even one such individual is able to inflict, the potential that a handful among 
thousands of migrants may harbor terrorist sentiments is a significant concern.  
Second, even assuming that most migrants are simply seeking a better life in a new nation, 
it is still possible that their movement facilitates the spread of terrorism. Bove and Bohmelt 
argue that the movement of migrants constitutes a physical link through which terrorism 
can spread from the terror-prone nation to the receiving nation.13 International diffusion 
and spatial dependency theories posit that regardless of the positive intentions of migrant 
groups, they can become a vehicle through which terrorism spreads from terrorist-prone 
nations to previously unaffected nations.14 Working in concert, international diffusion and 
social dependency theories suggest that migrants form strong social networks and 
diaspora communities that carry on the ideological, cultural, and ethnic heritage of their 
native countries. In the case of Muslim migrants, for example, even if the views migrants 
carry to their new countries are not in themselves radical or violent, the basic cultural and 
religious heritage they transport is still the foundation upon which radical Islamic 
terrorism is built. In essence, if the migrants are from a terrorist-prone nation, these 
networks and communities transplant the intellectual and cultural factors that contribute 
to the existence of terrorism in their native countries to their new country of residence. 
Additionally, research shows that these tight-knit expatriate groups are easily exploited for 
radicalization and recruitment by terrorists from their home country or culture.15 
Terrorists can use communities of first and second generation migrants as hubs through 
which to expand their reach into other nations and regions by radicalizing and recruiting 
recent migrants, by using migrant communities to hide their presence in a foreign nation, 
                                                 
10 Ibid, 572. 
11 Ibid. 
12 De Ming Fan, "The Immigration-Terrorism Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake," 33-52. 
13 Bove and Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” 575. 
14 Ibid, 575. 
15 Ibid, 575. 
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or by using social capital built by the migrant communities to make ideological inroads into 
the native population.  
This concept is similar to the way any group might expand into a new area. The first step is 
to identify a promising new location for expansion; the second step is to identify current 
members of the group that already live in the area to help establish a foothold. However, 
instead of trying to spread a particular store or social club to a new region, terrorists are 
seeking to export their radical agendas to other nations. In this way, migrants are a vehicle 
through which terrorism is transplanted to regions in which it is not native. 
An example of this phenomena is Rinkeby, Sweden. Rinkeby is a neighborhood outside of 
Stockholm that contains a large quantity of migrants from Muslim Africa and the Middle 
East.16 Swedish police forces have identified the area as a primary recruiting ground for 
Somalia-based Islamic terrorist groups, such as Shebab.17 While the Swedish Security 
Forces consider the likelihood of an attack on Swedish soil as improbable, they are aware 
that radicalized Swedish nationals and Sweden-based migrants are traveling abroad to 
attend terrorist training camps and participate in acts of terror in foreign locales.18 This 
example demonstrates that terrorist groups are willing and able to infiltrate migrant, non-
native populations and exploit their communities for radical ends—even if the migrants 
themselves were not originally radical. Shebab has used this tactic so effectively that it has 
been able to turn Sweden into an exporter of terrorism.  
There are two additional considerations that make the potential for terrorist exploitation 
of migrant communities especially concerning in the case of Muslim and Arab diaspora 
communities. The first is that these groups are generally perceived as different from the 
peoples of the western nations to which they migrate. Therefore, Muslim migrants are 
commonly ostracized or perceive themselves as being ostracized from mainstream western 
society and have limited opportunity for assimilation, especially in Europe.19 The second 
aspect is related to the significant flood of immigrants that entered Europe as a result of the 
migrant crisis in 2016. Western Europe, for example, has largely failed to assimilate non-
Caucasian migrants.20 Research shows that terrorists view unassimilated peoples as being 
especially susceptible to radicalization due to the feelings of discontent and alienation 
fostered by their situation.21 Both of these considerations increase the possibility that, in 
spite of the good intentions of the majority of migrants, terrorist organizations will 
successfully manipulate the social networks migrants create to further their radical 
agendas.    
Given that migrant communities are easily infiltrated by terrorist operatives and exploited 
for radicalization and recruitment, the question, as posed by Jozsef Kis-Benedek, is this: are 
                                                 
16 Robert Nicholson, “Swedish Open Immigration Policies - Correlation with Terrorism,” The Homeland 
Security Review 4, no. 3 (2010): 194. 
17 Ibid, 194.  
18 Ibid, 194-195.  
19 Ibid, 194. 
20 Ibid, 193. 
21 Jozsef Kis-Benedek, “Illegal Immigration and Terrorism,” Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues 5, no. 4 
(2016): 457. 
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terrorist groups willing and able to send their operatives into western nations?22 Kis-
Benedek posits that while terrorist groups are able to send operatives into western 
nations, they are not inclined to do so. He argues that sending operatives to Europe or the 
United States is a risky and expensive procedure that,23 especially in the case of the Islamic 
State, limits the group’s ability to accomplish its primary objective, which is to control Iraq 
and Syria.24 He also argues that ISIS does not need to export fighters to Europe because it 
actually imports converts from Europe to fight in Syria and Iraq.25 For example, over a two-
year period, the French government was tracking nearly a thousand French citizens who 
traveled to Syria to fight with ISIS.26 Other European nations are seeing similar numbers of 
their citizens fighting with ISIS in the Middle East.27 Additionally, there is no shortage of 
lone-wolf style European nationals who are willing to target their own countries either on 
behalf of or at the direction of the Islamic state.28 For example, the attackers in the Paris 
attacks in 2015 were Belgian and French nationals.29 
However, the author does point out that while it might usually be prohibitively risky to 
send operatives into Europe from the Middle East, a situation like the migrant crisis in 
2015 would change the incentives for terrorist groups.30 During the height of the migrant 
crisis, 60 million people were forced from their homes, many thousands of these migrants 
and refugees streamed into Europe without undergoing any significant security checks or 
registration.31 In this type of situation, the risks of sending in terrorist operatives decrease 
significantly. If the Islamic State is intent on attacking Europe, as the group has proclaimed 
and adequately demonstrated,32 this would have been an ideal opportunity to send in 
operatives.   
An additional consideration is whether the modern terrorist groups’ use of social media 
limits their need to physically enter foreign nations for recruitment and radicalization 
purposes. The Islamic State’s extensive use of social media as a propaganda tool may limit 
their need to use existing social networks among migrant communities as a stepping stone 
into new regions. In fact, ISIS recruits many followers from western nations who have little 
connection to ISIS other than through ISIS propaganda on the internet.33 Therefore, ISIS—
and similar terrorist groups—may not be inclined to send operatives into foreign nations 
and use the internet instead.  
While terrorist groups may use social media effectively, it seems unlikely that groups 
engaging in an activity—terrorism—that requires high levels of trust and reliability 
                                                 
22 Kis-Benedek, “Illegal Immigration and Terrorism,” 455. 
23 Ibid 456. 
24 Ibid, 460. 
25 Ibid, 461. 
26 Ibid, 461.  
27 Ibid, 461. 
28 Ibid, 456.  
29 Ibid, 456.  
30 Ibid, 463. 
31 Ibid, 463.  
32 Ibid, 461.  
33 Ibid, 456. 
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between its operatives would induct members through internet transactions, sight unseen. 
Research shows that social bonds between members play the most important role in 
radicalization and recruitment.34 Given the potential for government monitoring and the 
uncertain nature of online communications, it appears unlikely that terrorist groups would 
recruit in foreign nations entirely through social media. However, if terrorist groups are 
recruiting primarily among migrant groups of similar religious, ethnic, or cultural 
backgrounds, that would still constitute a link between migration from terror-prone 
nations and terrorism even if the interactions were mediated through social media.    
As the non-European migrant “siege” of Europe continues35 and the terrorist threat to 
Europe appears to loom larger every year,36 the question of immigration policy and the 
existence of a link to terrorism has become an increasingly important issue for the United 
States and European nations. Empirical research from 1970 to 2000 clearly shows that 
immigration from terror-prone nations leads to an increase in terrorism in previously 
unaffected nations.37 This finding is likely due to terrorists slipping in among refugee 
population and terrorist groups exploiting migrant communities as footholds for new 
operations and recruitment. Migrant radicalization is likely increased by poor economic 
and social opportunities in the receiving countries and by a lack of assimilation in 
general.38 However, in spite of the research to the contrary, debate on the relationship 
between terrorism and immigration has continued. One of the arguments that prompts this 
study is that Bove and Bohmelt’s findings only considered 1970-2000 and do not apply to 
the modern, post 9/11 world. A similar argument is that the changing world circumstances, 
including migration policies and social media, have fundamentally changed how terrorists 
recruit and have also decreased their need and willingness to physically enter foreign 
nations. If this claim is true, it might be reflected in a changed relationship between 
immigration and terrorism since the time of Bove and Bohmelt’s research. While it is true 
that Bove and Bohmelt’s study ended before the rise of ISIS and the 2015 migrant crisis in 
Europe, this study intends to prove that in spite of changing world circumstances, 
migration is still a vehicle through which terrorism is transplanted from terror-prone 
nations to other regions and nations.  
Hypothesis 
Looking at recent events, it is obvious that terrorism is a problem. Since terror attacks, 
much like any form of attack, are genuine threats to a nation’s security, correctly 
identifying the source of terror is crucial to protecting the national interest. Politicians and 
political leaders are quick to blame terrorism on one cause or another, with foreign 
immigration being a popular target. However, such reflexive decisions may be unhelpful if 
the cause of terrorism is misidentified. Therefore, wise policy decisions require an answer 
                                                 
34 Bove and Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” 575. 
35 Ana-Maria Bolborici, "The Immigration Crisis – Reflections Concerning the Crisis of European Identity," 
Social Sciences Law 9, no. 1 (January 2016): 39. 
36 Nicholson, “Swedish Open Immigration Policies - Correlation with Terrorism,” 199. 
37 Bove and Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” 572-588.  
38 Nicholson, “Swedish Open Immigration Policies - Correlation with Terrorism,” 193.   
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to the question of whether increases in immigration lead to increases in terrorism. The 
hypothesis of this research project is that as countries receive increased levels of asylum 
seekers from terror-prone nations, they will experience a corresponding increase in the 
number of terror attacks within the nation. Our basic premise is that immigrant flows form 
a social bridge, transplanting cultures, ideologies, and individuals between the sending and 
receiving nations. Usually this process is benign; however, when the migrants originate 
from a terror-producing nation, they facilitate the transfer of latent conflicts and 
extremism. They also mask the travel of terrorists, who hide like bandits among the lawful 
population seeking asylum in the nation or city of refuge. Thus, we are seeking to find out if 
there is a strong correlation between immigration and terrorism. The null hypothesis, then, 
is that there is no correlation between immigration from terror-prone nations and the 
occurrence of terror attacks within a particular nation.  
Methodology 
Six countries were selected (Germany, Turkey, Greece, United States, Canada, and 
Australia) based on their immigration policies, proximity to terror-prone countries, and 
their popularity as the country of destination for immigrants. For example, Germany was 
chosen due to its open immigration policy and its popularity as a destination for 
immigrants in 2015. Countries like Australia and the United States were selected due to 
recent actions taken and policies enacted to restrict or constrain immigration. Turkey and 
Greece were selected due to their very close proximity to those fleeing the Syrian crisis, 
while Canada was selected for its very tolerant stance on immigration. 
In order to examine the relationship between immigration and terrorism, it was necessary 
to locate databases with appropriate statistics. The database used to find out the Inflows of 
Asylum Seekers into each country from 2000-2015 was the International Migration 
Database of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The database 
used to find out the number of Terrorism Incidents in each country from 2000-2015 was 
the Global Terrorism Database. 
 After collecting the appropriate data for each country, numerous statistical tests could 
finally be run for each of the six countries. The first step was to examine whether or not 
there was a positive trend in inflows of asylum seekers from 2000-2015. The second step 
was to examine whether or not there was a positive trend in terrorism incidents from 
2000-2015. After establishing the nature of the trend of each variable individually, a 
scatterplot was created for both variables together to examine the potential for a positive 
correlation. Since the number of inflows of asylum seekers was in the hundreds of 
thousands, it was necessary to scale the number down in order to align more with the 
number of terrorism incidents, which were in the tens and hundreds. 
Then a set of descriptive statistics was run that examined the mean and median for the 
inflows of asylum seekers (by thousands). Another set of descriptive statistics were run 
examining the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation for the inflows of 
asylum seekers (by thousands). A table is also included with the Pearson’s Correlation 
Page 88   Beck, Diza, Searl • Bridges and Bandits                          Beck, Diza, Searl • Bridges and 
 
number and significance between the Inflows of Asylum Seekers and Terrorism Incidents. 
A description of the p value, degrees of freedom, critical value for a one-tailed test, r, and 
coefficient of determination are included in order to help highlight key facts that would be 
needed in order to draw conclusions from the statistics run. 
The last set of statistics run for countries was a linear regression for those countries where 
there was a very strong linear correlation between inflows of asylum seekers and terrorism 
incidents. Appropriate tables are included below in the “Results” section of our study. For 
example, the ANOVA test was run and the F-test was examined in order to see if the null 
hypothesis would need to be rejected. Also included is the predicted number of terrorism 
incidents for countries if the number of asylum inflows was to increase markedly. There is 
also an indication of the mean number of terrorism incidents within a 95% confidence and 
prediction interval. 
Lastly, an examination of the percent of asylum seekers in each of our six countries that 
were coming from terror-prone countries was made. There was a tool in the International 
Migration Database that allows for one to control the statistics for the country of birth or 
nationality of asylum seekers. Based on the Global Terrorism Index, the number of asylum 
seekers from the top 5 countries with the highest impact of terrorism (Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria) was examined in regard to their proportion of the total asylum 
seekers in each of our six selected countries. The results from this in-depth study of a 
certain variable are visually displayed in line graphs. 
Results 
Germany 
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with incidents 
of terrorism (on the right) in Germany. The general trend of both lines shows an increase 
after 2013, which indicates a potential correlation between both variables. 
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The scatterplot below demonstrates a very strong correlation between inflows of asylum 
seekers and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.901. 
 
 
 
Turkey 
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with incidents 
of terrorism (on the right) in Turkey. The general trend of both lines shows an increase 
after 2013, which indicates a potential correlation between both variables. However, there 
was a marked decrease in terrorism incidents between 2012 and 2013 while there was a 
steady increase of asylum seekers into the country during that time. 
 
 
The scatterplot below demonstrates a strong correlation between inflows of asylum 
seekers and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.550. 
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Greece 
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with incidents 
of terrorism (on the right) in Greece. The general trend of both is quite different, which 
indicates that the potential correlation between both variables is unlikely. The inflows of 
asylum seekers only spiked in number between 2014 and 2015. However, there has been a 
steady increase in terrorism incidents since 2010 - four years earlier. 
 
 
The scatterplot below demonstrates a weak correlation between inflows of asylum seekers 
and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.005. 
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United States of America 
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with incidents 
of terrorism (on the right) in the United States of America. The general trend of both is 
markedly different, which indicates that the potential correlation between both variables is 
unlikely. The inflows of asylum seekers spiked between 2013 and 2014 but dropped back 
down between 2014 and 2015. Terrorism incidents post-9/11 decreased significantly in 
the U.S., and a steady uptick in incidents did not occur again until 2012. 
 
 
The scatterplot below demonstrates a weak correlation between inflows of asylum seekers 
and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.093. 
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Canada 
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with incidents 
of terrorism (on the right) in Canada. The general trend of both is quite different, which 
indicates that the potential correlation between both variables is unlikely. In fact, the 
graphs seem to indicate a potential negative correlation between both variables. The 
inflows of asylum seekers decreased until experiencing a steady increase between 2013 
and 2015. Terrorism activity in Canada has never exceeded five total incidents per year, 
and data is sporadic at best.  
 
 
The scatterplot below demonstrates a weak, negative correlation between inflows of 
asylum seekers and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.061. 
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Australia 
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with incidents 
of terrorism (on the right) in Australia. The general trend of both is dissimilar, which 
indicates that the potential correlation between both variables is unlikely. The inflows of 
asylum seekers steadily increased from 2005 to 2012. However, terrorism incidents in 
Australia have remained relatively low during that time period. 
 
 
The scatterplot below demonstrates a weak correlation between inflows of asylum seekers 
and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.065. 
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Summary of Data 
As is clear from the data sets from Germany and Turkey, the strong linear relationship 
anticipated between immigration and terrorism can be present in certain conditions. 
Germany displayed the strongest correlation such that 90% of the variance in terrorism 
incidents can be explained by the inflows of asylum seekers. Turkey’s correlation was also 
strong to the point that 55% of the variance in terrorism incidents can be explained by 
inflows of asylum seekers.39 Other than Germany and Turkey, every country shows a weak 
correlation between asylum seeker inflow and terrorism incidents. Given that the f score 
for Germany and Turkey exceed the critical value, we can say that this correlation is not 
due to chance. 
The question, then, is why Germany and Turkey display these uncharacteristically strong 
correlations. Some potential variables could be proximity to terror-prone areas, the vetting 
procedures used, immigration policy, or proportion of asylum seekers allowed in from 
terror-producing countries. The variable most likely to exert the most influence is the 
proportion of asylum seekers from terror-prone countries. Looking at this data as a percent 
(percentage of asylum-seekers coming from Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria), 
it is clear that Germany is far above other countries in terms of accepting migrants from 
terror-prone areas since 2006. This finding would indicate that the proportion of asylum-
seekers from terror-prone countries is a strong predictor of future terrorist activity. 
However, in spite of its numerous terrorist attacks, Turkey’s migration levels from terror-
prone nations have not been outside the normal range of the other nations considered in 
the study. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the terror attacks Turkey has 
                                                 
39
 The level of risk for this study was p = .05. 
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suffered are more closely related to its own internal policies and disputes, such as its 
ongoing conflict with Kurdish militant groups. It is also possible that its attacks are linked 
to its close proximity to terror-prone countries. 
 
Analysis of Results 
As predicted in our hypothesis, the data demonstrates that increased terrorism is linked to 
increased migration from terror-prone nations and regions. This connection is most clearly 
demonstrated in the data from Germany and Turkey, both of which display a strong 
positive correlation between asylum-seeker migration and incidents of terrorism. The 
terrorism-immigration link in Germany is exceptionally strong, likely because of its open-
border policy during the refugee crisis of 2015, its status as a desirable location for 
migrants due to its financial success, and its geographical proximity to terror-producing 
nations.  
The data from Turkey, on the other hand, has a weaker correlation between immigration 
and terrorism and a smaller portion of migrants from terror-prone nations than Germany. 
This finding likely indicates that Turkey’s terrorism is only partially caused by immigration. 
The literature on this subject lends credence to the conclusion that terrorism in Turkey is 
at least partially influenced by its geographic proximity to terror-producing nations 
through the effects of spatial diffusion40 as well as the ongoing conflict in neighboring Iraq 
and Syria. In fact, our hypothesis that immigration from terror-prone nations leads to 
terrorism in the receiving country is based on the assumption that migrant flows perform 
essentially the same function as a spatial link—or bridge—between nations. Where a 
physical, geographic link already exists, it is fair to conclude that the diffusion of terrorist 
                                                 
40
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activity and ideology would be less dependent on migrant flows and thus less correlated to 
immigration. 
The data from the United States shows a weak correlation between immigration and 
terrorism. We posit that the United States is a natural outlier to the general pattern of 
correlation between immigration from terror-prone nations and the occurrence of terrorist 
activity. Thus, we would expect the data from the United States to neither confirm nor 
disprove our hypothesis due to its anomalous characteristics. First, we would anticipate the 
United States to be an outlier because it is intentionally targeted, regardless of immigration, 
by terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Terrorists, especially those of 
Islamic ideological backgrounds, purposefully target the United States to a degree 
experienced by almost no other westernized nation—with the notable exception of Israel. 
Second, the United States has an exceptionally robust migrant vetting process—enabled by 
its relatively remote geographical position—that effectively constrains the default 
correlation between terrorism and immigration.41 Additionally, the strength of American 
immigration controls and the physical distance between the United States and terrorist 
hubs in the Middle East likely provide significant disincentive for attempted terrorist 
infiltration. This situation is almost the exact opposite of the state of European nations 
during the refugee crisis of 2015. Middle Eastern immigrants traveled a relativity short 
distance, often over land, into a borderless Europe. The geographical proximity and the 
almost complete lack of vetting and border control created an excellent opportunity for 
terrorist infiltration into Europe.42 The United States was largely immune to the migrant 
crisis because of its distant location and firm border controls. Given these two significant 
departures from the global norm, we would expect—precisely as the data shows—that the 
United States would demonstrate a deviation from the typical relationship between 
immigration and terrorism. 
The data from Australia shows a weak correlation between immigration and terrorism. 
However, this finding is not unexpected given Australia’s appearance as an outlier. It is far 
removed from terror-producing nations geographically, it has limited inflows of migrants, 
and it has large areas of undeveloped land upon which migrants could settle, thus reducing 
the potential for societal strife between migrants and native populations. Similar to the 
United States, these significant peculiarities separate Australia from the global norm. 
Additionally, Australia’s extremely low rate of terrorist activity limits the ability to 
construct a meaningful analysis of its migrant inflows. 
The data from Greece is intriguing because they have experienced high levels of terrorist 
activity over the last several years, but at first glance, it does not appear to be related to 
immigration. It is possible that the spike in the percentage of immigrants from terror-prone 
nations in the early 2000s was an influence on the large increase in terrorist activity that 
occurred during the late 2000s, specifically beginning in 2007. However, drawing 
conclusions from Greece’s data is questionable because, though it is considered part of the 
westernized, civilized world, the nation itself has essentially been terror prone since the 
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42
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1970s. Beginning in the mid-1970s, Greece has experienced enduring, systemic terrorist 
activity against their civic institutions.43 Most of this activity is perpetrated by 
revolutionary guerrilla terrorist groups seeking to achieve various, though uniformly 
leftist, political ends.44 The activity of Greece’s homegrown terrorist groups masks the 
effects of immigration and makes it difficult to discern how much of its 2007-2011 spike in 
terrorism was caused by pre-existing Greek extremism and how much by immigration 
from terror-prone nations. That being said, the peaks in terror-prone immigration and 
terrorist activity—though separated by time—are similar enough to lend support to the 
idea that immigration played a role in the increased terrorist activity. Additionally, the 
notion of a delay between the influx of migrants and increased terrorist activity is not 
unsupported. Research suggests that radicalization of migrants is related to the 
discontentment fostered by a lack of assimilation into the host nation.45 Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that migrant radicalization would not occur right away. The 
percolation of sufficient levels of economic and social distress would take some amount of 
time. This concept lends weight to the position that increased terrorism in Greece could be 
related to a delayed instead of immediate response to immigration from terror-prone 
nations.     
Meanwhile, Canada’s negative correlation between immigration and terrorism further 
reinforces our overall conclusion that it is immigration from terror-prone nations that 
leads to the spread of terrorism to new regions and not simply immigration in general that 
accomplishes this end. Existing research suggests that immigration itself is naturally 
negatively related to terrorism unless the migrants originate from a terror-prone nation or 
region.46 Therefore, Canada’s negative correlation between immigration and terrorism is 
exactly what one would expect if our hypothesis was correct given its relatively low levels 
of migrants from terror-prone nations.  
Conclusion 
Conflict, poverty, and adverse political environments over the last several decades have 
prompted a significant rise in international immigration. Recent reports estimate that the 
number of international migrants reaches well over 232 million.47 During roughly this 
same period of increased migration, terrorism has become an increasingly prominent and 
deadly phenomena. Whether these two factors are related is a matter of intense debate 
wherever individuals meet to discuss issues of national and international concern. 
Our research shows that, as predicted in our hypothesis, increased terrorism is linked to 
increased migration from terror-prone nations and regions. The data from Germany and 
Turkey display a strong positive correlation between asylum-seeker migration and 
                                                 
43
 George Kassimeris, “Greece: The Persistence of Political Terrorism,” International Affairs 89, no. 1 (2013): 132. 
44
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 Nicholson, “Swedish Open Immigration Policies - Correlation with Terrorism,” 199. 
46
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incidents of terrorism.  It is worth noting that immigration alone is not enough to predict a 
rise in terrorist attacks. The data from Germany, the nation with the strongest correlation 
between immigration and terrorism, simply indicates that migration from terror-producing 
areas is a strong indicator of a rise in terrorist incidents. This is not to say that immigration 
from terror-prone regions is the only factor giving rise to terrorism in receiving countries. 
Rather, immigration is only one of many factors that may lead to increased terrorism. 
However, it is our contention that immigration from terror-producing regions is a 
significant predictor of increased terrorist activity. 
The conclusion that immigration from terror-prone nations is related to increased 
terrorism in the receiving country is not surprising. In fact, these results are exactly what 
one would expect given the existing research on this topic. Thus, immigration is indeed a 
physical link similar to a bridge that allows for the travel of the ideology, culture, and 
bandit-like terrorist individuals necessary for the transfer of extremism from terror-
producing nations to previously unaffected regions. The value of this study is that it 
confirms and supports earlier research, especially the research conducted by Bove and 
Bohmelt, and demonstrates that the correlation between immigration and terrorism holds 
notwithstanding changing world circumstances, including the recent immigration crisis. 
Additionally, this research highlights the need for discerning immigration policies. In terms 
of the potential for increased terrorist activity, immigration from a terror-prone nation is 
not synonymous with immigration as a whole. A policy that misses this essential 
differentiation risks incorrectly assessing a substantial threat of additional terrorist 
activity.  
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics 
Germany 
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard deviation 
for the inflows of asylum seekers for Germany. The data was divided up into quartiles to 
help streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results from the 
Pearson Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is .949. 
Further information critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate 
table. 
 
Statistics (by thousands) 
 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015 
N Valid 4 4 4 4 
Missing 12 12 12 12 
Mean 72.25 26.25 34.25 197.50 
Median 75.00 25.00 34.50 141.50 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (by thousands) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2000-2003 4 51 88 72.25 15.777 
2004-2007 4 19 36 26.25 7.805 
2008-2011 4 22 46 34.25 11.147 
2012-2015 4 65 442 197.50 168.911 
Valid N (listwise) 4     
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
 
Inflows Asylum 
Seekers 
Terrorism 
Incidents 
Inflows Asylum Seekers Pearson Correlation 1 .949** 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .000 
N 16 16 
Terrorism Incidents Pearson Correlation .949** 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000  
N 16 16 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
p <.05 
df = 14 
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259 
r = .949 
Coefficient of Determination = .901 
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90% of variance accounted for 
Turkey 
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard deviation 
for the inflows of asylum seekers for Turkey. The data was divided up into quartiles to help 
streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results from the Pearson 
Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is .742. Further 
information critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate table. 
 
Statistics (by thousands) 
 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015 
N Valid 4 4 4 4 
Missing 12 12 12 12 
Mean 4.75 5.25 11.50 62.75 
Median 4.50 4.50 11.00 66.50 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (by thousands) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2000-2003 4 4 6 4.75 .957 
2004-2007 4 4 8 5.25 1.893 
2008-2011 4 8 16 11.50 3.697 
2012-2015 4 26 92 62.75 32.449 
Valid N (listwise) 4     
 
 
Correlations 
 
Inflows Asylum 
Seekers 
Terrorism 
Incidents 
Inflows Asylum Seekers Pearson Correlation 1 .742** 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .000 
N 16 16 
Terrorism Incidents Pearson Correlation .742** 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000  
N 16 16 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
p <.05 
df = 14 
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259 
r = .742 
Coefficient of Determination = .551 
55% of variance accounted for 
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Greece 
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard deviation 
for the inflows of asylum seekers for Greece. The data was divided up into quartiles to help 
streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results from the Pearson 
Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is .067. Further 
information critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate table. 
 
Statistics (by thousands) 
 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015 
N Valid 4 4 4 4 
Missing 12 12 12 12 
Mean 5.50 12.50 13.75 46.75 
Median 5.50 10.50 13.00 9.50 
 
Descriptive Statistics (by thousands) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2000-2003 4 3 8 5.50 2.082 
2004-2007 4 4 25 12.50 8.963 
2008-2011 4 9 20 13.75 5.188 
2012-2015 4 8 160 46.75 75.504 
Valid N (listwise) 4     
 
 
Correlations 
 
Inflows Asylum 
Seekers 
Terrorism 
Incident 
Inflows Asylum Seekers Pearson Correlation 1 .067 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .403 
N 16 16 
Terrorism Incident Pearson Correlation .067 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .403  
N 16 16 
 
p <.05 
df = 14 
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259 
r = .067 
Coefficient of Determination = .004 
.45 % of variance accounted for 
United States of America  
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard deviation 
for the inflows of asylum seekers for the United States of America. The data was divided up 
into quartiles to help streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results 
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from the Pearson Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is 
.307. Further information critical to interpreting the results is included below the 
appropriate table. 
Statistics (by thousands) 
 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015 
N Valid 4 4 4 4 
Missing 12 12 12 12 
Mean 50.25 41.25 45.25 81.25 
Median 50.50 40.50 41.00 69.00 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (by thousands) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2000-2003 4 41 59 50.25 9.570 
2004-2007 4 39 45 41.25 2.630 
2008-2011 4 38 61 45.25 10.720 
2012-2015 4 66 121 81.25 26.550 
Valid N (listwise) 4     
 
 
Correlations 
 
Inflows Asylum 
Seekers 
Terrorism 
Incident 
Inflows Asylum Seekers Pearson Correlation 1 .307 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .123 
N 16 16 
Terrorism Incident Pearson Correlation .307 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .123  
N 16 16 
 
p <.05 
df = 14 
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259 
r = .307 
Coefficient of Determination = .094 
9 % of variance accounted for 
Canada 
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard deviation 
for the inflows of asylum seekers for Canada. The data was divided up into quartiles to help 
streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results from the Pearson 
Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is -.252. Further 
information critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate table. 
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Statistics (by thousands) 
 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015 
N Valid 4 4 4 4 
Missing 12 12 12 12 
Mean 37.25 24.50 29.25 15.25 
Median 36.50 24.50 29.50 15.50 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (by thousands) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2000-2003 4 32 44 37.25 5.377 
2004-2007 4 21 28 24.50 3.109 
2008-2011 4 23 35 29.25 6.131 
2012-2015 4 10 20 15.25 4.573 
Valid N (listwise) 4     
 
 
Correlations 
 
Inflows Asylum 
Seekers 
Terorrism 
Incident 
Inflows Asylum Seekers Pearson Correlation 1 -.252 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .174 
N 16 16 
 Terrorism Incident Pearson Correlation -.252 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .174  
N 16 16 
 
p <.05 
df = 14 
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259 
r = -.252 
Coefficient of Determination = .064 
6 % of variance accounted for 
Australia 
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard deviation 
for the inflows of asylum seekers for Australia. The data was divided up into quartiles to 
help streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results from the 
Pearson Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is .249. 
Further information critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate 
table. 
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Statistics (by thousands) 
 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015 
N Valid 4 4 4 4 
Missing 12 12 12 12 
Mean 8.75 3.50 7.75 12.75 
Median 9.00 3.50 7.00 13.00 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (by thousands) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2000-2003 4 4 13 8.75 4.425 
2004-2007 4 3 4 3.50 .577 
2008-2011 4 5 12 7.75 3.096 
2012-2015 4 9 16 12.75 2.986 
Valid N (listwise) 4     
 
 
Correlations 
 
Inflows Asylum 
Seekers 
Terrorism 
Incidents 
Inflows Asylum Seekers Pearson Correlation 1 .249 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .176 
N 16 16 
Terrorism Incidents Pearson Correlation .249 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .176  
N 16 16 
 
p <.05 
df = 14 
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259 
r = .249 
Coefficient of Determination = .062 
6 % of variance accounted for 
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Appendix B: Linear Regression  
Germany 
Because there was a very strong, positive linear correlation between inflows of asylum 
seekers and terrorism incidents for Germany, a linear regression was run in order to 
determine whether the correlation would continue into 2016 if numbers increased. In 
addition, an f test was run to determine whether the differences between variables are not 
due to chance. If the f value exceeds the critical value, then we can say that the differences 
between inflows of asylum seekers and terrorism incidents are not due to chance. Relevant 
information for interpreting results are provided underneath the appropriate table. Lastly, 
further descriptive statistics are provided to round out the linear regression analysis. 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .949a .901 .894 3.857 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Inflows Asylum Seekers By Thousands 
b. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1889.502 1 1889.502 127.027 .000b 
Residual 208.248 14 14.875   
Total 2097.750 15    
a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Inflows Asylum Seekers By Thousands 
 
p <.05 
df = 14 
Critical Value = 4.60 
F = 127 
 
Predicted Number of Terrorism Incidents (if asylum inflows are 500,000) - 52 
95% confidence interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 43 and 61 
95% prediction interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 40 and 64 
 
Predicted Number of Terrorism Incidents (if asylum inflows are 600,000) – 63 
95% confidence interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 52 and 74 
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95% prediction interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 49 and 76 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 (Constant) -1.537 1.247  -1.232 .238 -4.211 1.138 
Inflows 
Asylum 
Seekers By 
Thousands 
.108 .010 .949 11.271 .000 .087 .128 
a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value .51 46.17 7.38 11.223 16 
Std. Predicted Value -.611 3.457 .000 1.000 16 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.965 3.575 1.217 .635 16 
Adjusted Predicted Value .28 22.83 5.93 6.430 16 
Residual -10.337 4.571 .000 3.726 16 
Std. Residual -2.680 1.185 .000 .966 16 
Stud. Residual -2.775 2.644 .101 1.180 16 
Deleted Residual -11.080 27.171 1.443 7.878 16 
Stud. Deleted Residual -3.986 3.602 .084 1.529 16 
Mahal. Distance .001 11.949 .938 2.943 16 
Cook's Distance .000 21.319 1.368 5.321 16 
Centered Leverage Value .000 .797 .063 .196 16 
a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
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Turkey 
Because there was a strong, positive linear correlation between inflows of asylum 
seekers and terrorism incidents for Turkey, a linear regression was run in order to 
determine whether the correlation would continue into 2016 if numbers increased. 
In addition, an f test was run to determine whether the differences between 
variables are not due to chance. If the f value exceeds the critical value, then we can 
say that the differences between inflows of asylum seekers and terrorism incidents 
are not due to chance. Relevant information for interpreting results are provided 
underneath the appropriate table. Lastly, further descriptive statistics are provided 
to round out the linear regression analysis. 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .742a .550 .518 71.346 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Inflows Asylum Seekers By Thousands 
b. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 87105.112 1 87105.112 17.112 .001b 
Residual 71263.888 14 5090.278   
Total 158369.000 15    
a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Inflows Asylum Seekers By Thousands 
 
p <.05 
df = 14 
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Critical Value = 4.60 
F = 17 
 
Predicted Number of Terrorism Incidents (if asylum inflows are 100,000) - 274 
95% confidence interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 160 and 388 
95% prediction interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 83 and 465 
 
Predicted Number of Terrorism Incidents (if asylum inflows are 600,000) – 537 
95% confidence interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 290 and 784 
95% prediction interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 246 and 827 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval for B 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 
1 (Constant) 11.360 22.303  .509 .618 -36.476 59.195 
Inflows 
Asylum 
Seekers By 
Thousands 
2.630 .636 .742 4.137 .001 1.266 3.993 
a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 21.88 253.30 66.75 76.204 16 
Std. Predicted Value -.589 2.448 .000 1.000 16 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
18.111 48.496 23.531 9.385 16 
Adjusted Predicted Value 20.09 352.63 65.21 84.236 16 
Residual -152.783 162.698 .000 68.927 16 
Std. Residual -2.141 2.280 .000 .966 16 
Stud. Residual -2.808 3.109 .008 1.215 16 
Deleted Residual -262.625 302.433 1.536 111.312 16 
Stud. Deleted Residual -4.093 5.385 .075 1.838 16 
Mahal. Distance .029 5.993 .938 1.856 16 
Cook's Distance .000 4.151 .449 1.212 16 
Centered Leverage Value .002 .400 .063 .124 16 
a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
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